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OVERVIEW — This background paper traces the development within
American health care of two interrelated trends and activities: an evidence-
based approach to medical practice and the critical evaluation of new tech-
nologies with respect to their costs and effectiveness. Over the past 35 years
each of these developments has increasingly shaped the coverage decisions
of public and private health insurers, and their importance for coverage
policy is certain to grow. The paper also contrasts the different approaches
to such “evidence-” or “value-based” coverage policy in the mixed public
and private U.S. health care enterprise with the approach taken in Great
Britain’s single-payer National Health Service.
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 2
National Health Policy Forum
Facilitating dialogue.
Fostering understanding.
2131 K Street NW, Suite 500
Washington DC 20037
202/872-1390
202/862-9837 [fax]
nhpf@gwu.edu [e-mail]
www.nhpf.org [web]
Judith Miller Jones
Director
Sally Coberly
Deputy Director
Monique Martineau
Publications Director
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 3
BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 4
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AS THEORY AND PRACTICE ................. 6
Clinical Practice Guidelines ........................................................... 6
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force ................................................ 8
DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES ..................................................................... 8
The FDA’s Initial Role ..................................................................... 8
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment:
Focus for a New Field ................................................................... 9
Evolution from NCHSR to
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality ............................... 10
AHRQ: A NEW APPROACH ............................................................. 11
Evidence-Based Practice Centers ................................................. 11
A New Collaboration with CMS:
The Effective Healthcare Program ............................................... 12
Pharmaceutical Outcomes Research ............................................ 13
AHRQ’s Delivery-System-Based Research and
Demonstration Networks ............................................................ 13
MEDICARE COVERAGE POLICY ...................................................... 13
Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee .................................... 14
Assessing New Technologies for the Medicare Program .............. 15
National Coverage Determinations ............................................. 15
Coverage with Evidence Development ........................................ 15
PRIVATE-SECTOR AND STATE INITIATIVES ........................................ 18
Blue Cross Blue Shield Association’s
Technology Evaluation Center ..................................................... 19
Drug Formularies ........................................................................ 19
THE BRITISH NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR HEALTH AND CLINICAL EXCELLENCE (NICE) ............................ 21
Technology Appraisal Process ...................................................... 21
A STUDY IN CONTRASTS (AND SIMILARITIES) ................................. 24
BARRIERS TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
VALUE-BASED COVERAGE.............................................................. 26
ENDNOTES ..................................................................................... 27
GLOSSARY ..................................................................................... 33
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 3
Value-Based Coverage Policy in
the United States and the United
Kingdom: Different Paths to a
Common Goal
Whenever a third-party payer—someone other than the patient or the
patient’s family— is involved, the question “Is this service covered?” can
come up. Patients/consumers ask the question because the answer deter-
mines their out-of-pocket costs for the service. Health service providers
ask because coverage affects the likelihood that they will be paid. The
response has also been important to health care insurers and purchasers
(typically employers or government programs) because it affects their
profitability or solvency. With health care now accounting for 16 percent
of the U.S. economy, the answer to “Is this service covered?” also matters
for society overall. The value-for-money of the U.S. investment in health
care is a growing concern. Yet how health plans—private insurers, em-
ployers, managed care organizations, Medicare, and Medicaid—decide
which services should be covered is fraught with countervailing interests
and considerations. “Value-based coverage policy,” which takes the fi-
nancial consequences as well as the clinical implications of coverage deci-
sions into account, is one approach to making these determinations that
is increasingly advocated (and challenged) in technologically advanced
economies around the globe.
Health care services paid for by health plans (private or public) are de-
scribed in general terms by benefit categories, for example, physician ser-
vices, hospital inpatient care, and physical therapy. Sometimes a plan will
specify a maximum amount of a covered benefit, for instance, limiting
the number of hospital days or physician visits that it will pay for within
a certain time period. Experimental therapies have traditionally been ex-
cluded from insurance coverage. These kinds of provisions are referred
to as limits to the amount, duration, and scope of covered benefits. Forty
years ago, when private insurance for hospital and physician services was
still a relatively young industry (and Medicare and Medicaid were in their
infancy), whether or not a service was covered depended more on who
provided the service or where the service was provided than it did on the
particular service itself. As the array of medical services and technologies
has burgeoned, however, naming broad categories of services and limit-
ing coverage in terms of volume (the number of physician visits in a month
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or the number of hospital days during a spell of illness) no longer suffice.
Even blanket exclusion of care involving experimental therapies has been
reconsidered as the costs of clinical research have risen drastically.
Coverage policies affect the use of services, the speed with which new in-
terventions are adopted, the quality of health care provided, and ultimately
health outcomes. They also affect the level of overall health care spending
and help determine the value realized for dollars spent on health care. Health
policymakers have a vital interest in how decisions are made about which
health care interventions (see endnote)1 will be paid for and under what
conditions particular interventions are considered covered benefits.
Over the past four decades, health care decision-makers in the United
States and the United Kingdom have taken distinctly different approaches
to evaluating interventions and making coverage determinations. A com-
parison of these differences illustrates that, to paraphrase George Ber-
nard Shaw, these are two nations divided by their responses to a common
problem. Contrasting these responses may provide policymakers with
valuable insights as they endeavor to promote effective medical practices
and contend with ever-rising health care costs.
BACKGROUND
Forty years ago, the medical profession’s best judgments about standards
of care and appropriate interventions for particular medical conditions
largely determined what constituted appropriate medical care. The basis
of the Medicare program’s coverage policy—statutory language borrowed
from private health insurance policies—is essentially the same as it was
when Medicare was enacted in 1965: Coverage and payment are limited
to items and services that are deemed to be “reasonable and necessary”
for the treatment of illness or injury. In the health care arena today, how-
ever, professional judgment no longer suffices as the arbiter of coverage
policy. Medical care has become too complex and too expensive to rely
on professional consensus alone. In 2004, health care accounted for 16
percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) or $6,280, on average,
for every man, woman, and child. In 1970, the corresponding figures were
about 7 percent of GDP and $480 per capita (in today’s dollars).2
Some of this rapid growth in spending on health services can be attrib-
uted to general price inflation, increased use of health care by people with
little or no access to services in the past, and an aging population. A sig-
nificant component of the growth in health care costs, however, is due to
increased intensity of services provided to each patient—in significant mea-
sure because of newer, more complex interventions. Yet physicians, insur-
ers, public program managers, and large group purchasers of health care
(employers and unions) do not know the extent to which the increased use
of more technologically advanced health care, at growing cost, improves
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health outcomes. More critically, there is often little or no scientific evi-
dence for physicians to determine the likelihood of a particular patient’s
having an improved outcome with a certain course of treatment. And
even when scientifically valid evidence supports the effectiveness of a
particular intervention and identifies which types of patients are most
likely to benefit from it, practicing clinicians are overloaded with infor-
mation about advances in practice and may not apply new knowledge.
These trends and problems are not limited to the U.S. health care enter-
prise. Economically developed nations around the world, with health care
delivery systems and financing structures that are quite different from
those in the U.S., are experiencing similar growth in health care costs due
to rapidly expanding and technologically sophisticated interventions—
and greater use of services by their populations. Between 1999 and 2004,
for example, the annual rate of growth in per capita health expenditures
(in real terms) was 4.0 percent for Canada, 4.5 percent for New Zealand,
3.9 percent for Sweden, 5.4 percent for the United Kingdom, and 4.8 per-
cent in the United States.3
Other nations also face the challenges of developing a better knowledge
base for medical practice and ensuring that this information is acces-
sible to and readily used by health care provid-
ers and patients. To the extent that health care
practice is grounded in scientifically valid evi-
dence, advances in practice have global relevance.
The results of evaluations of the accuracy of a new
diagnostic test or of studies of the clinical effectiveness of a pharmaceu-
tical product can be shared across national borders, as long as any rel-
evant differences among populations and professional practices are taken
into account.
Over the past 35 years, the evaluation of health care interventions (“health
technology assessment”) and determinations of coverage in the United
States have been dispersed among a number of public and private enti-
ties. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, these same activities have
occurred within that country’s universal, centrally financed National
Health Service (NHS), spearheaded by the NHS’s National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE).4 A comparison of the approaches
taken by these two very different health care systems and the political
and policy levers available within each system is revealing. For example,
unlike most coverage decisions made in the United States, the more cen-
tralized technology assessment process in Great Britain considers infor-
mation about an intervention’s cost effectiveness when deciding whether
that intervention should be provided within the NHS. At the same time,
Great Britain’s more systematic approach to assessing new health care
interventions has prompted the more rapid introduction of effective new
interventions throughout the NHS, particularly within local health au-
thorities, or “trusts,” that had been slow to introduce them.
To the extent that health care practice is
grounded in scientifically valid evidence,
advances in practice have global relevance.
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EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AS THEORY AND
PRACTICE
The rapid growth in clinical research in the latter half of the twentieth
century spurred the development of a new aspiration for medical prac-
tice: “evidence-based medicine” (EBM). Progress in the biological sciences
yielded insights into basic physiological processes and disease mechanisms.
This new knowledge, combined with the statistical tools and methods of
the emerging discipline of clinical epidemiology, produced an unprec-
edented volume of research literature relevant to medical practice.5 The
increase in the number of randomized clinical trials was exponential; more
than half of all the clinical trials conducted between 1954, when the first
trial was conducted, and 1995 were completed in the last five years of that
period. Over 10,000 new trials were reported in 1995.6 MEDLINE, the bio-
medical bibliographic database of the U.S. National Library of Medicine,
contains approximately 13 million references; more than 500,000 of these
were added in 2004 alone.7
The tools of EBM include literature reviews, criteria for assessing the qual-
ity of research evidence for the effectiveness of a health care practice or
intervention, and explicit clinical practice guidelines. Faced with formi-
dable amounts of research findings to assimilate and limited time to fol-
low developments in medical science, clinicians have come to rely on
medical journal survey articles that summarize the research relevant to a
particular condition or medical intervention. Over time, the format and
content of such survey articles themselves have been formalized and be-
come more rigorous, with professional societies such as the American
College of Physicians and the editors of the British Medical Journal estab-
lishing publications standards for systematic literature reviews.8
Systematic literature reviews employ strategies to reduce bias in the iden-
tification, appraisal, and synthesis of studies addressing a specific clinical
question. These strategies include “grading” the quality of evidence pro-
duced with a given research design in a particular study. In some cases,
the quantitative results of different randomized clinical trials are com-
bined in meta-analyses, to create summary estimates of the impact of a
particular intervention.
Clinical Practice Guidelines
In addition to increasingly rigorous systematic literature reviews, evidence-
based medicine has been promoted through clinical practice guidelines.
Long promulgated by professional societies in North America and Europe,
such “systematically defined statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances”9
have in the past few decades become better grounded in research evidence.10
It should not be surprising that the earliest evidence-based guidelines were
for clinical preventive services. Preventive services aim to protect and
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improve “statistical lives”—the estimated number of people in a popula-
tion group of a certain size that faces a risk of disease or death without
the screening services. Diagnostic and therapeutic services, in contrast,
treat the problems of identified patients. The desire to do something rather
than nothing for people presenting with illness or injury is strong. It can
override the analytical and critical question of whether what can be done
is actually effective or beneficial. Also, because preventive services (such
Evidence-based medicine
appears to be a relatively
recent development; in fact,
it simply represents the lat-
est stage in the evolution of best practices in the
art and science of medicine. Likewise, value-
based coverage policy seems novel, yet it too is
continuous, with activities going back at least 35
years. A number of related factors have contrib-
uted to these paradigms.
First, evidence-based medicine (EBM) grew out
of the vastly improved information about clini-
cal mechanisms and outcomes that became avail-
able during the second half of the last century.
Revolutionary advances in the biological sciences
and in epidemiology—particularly the innova-
tion of the randomized clinical trial—not only put
the practice of medicine on a sounder scientific
footing, but also presented clinicians with an
enormous amount of clinical evidence to assimi-
late and interpret.
Second, powerful and frequently expensive new
technologies, including diagnostic equipment, sur-
gical interventions, and pharmaceuticals, have pro-
liferated over the past four decades (for example,
CT (computed tomography) scanners in the early
1970s), and their startling costs and rapid spread
have raised questions about their appropriate use.
Third, geographic variations in clinical practices
and investments in medical technology have per-
sisted since they were initially documented more
than three decades ago, without evidence of cor-
responding impacts on health outcomes. This
prompted researchers, health care purchasers,
and policymakers to inves-
tigate the relationship be-
tween particular clinical
practices and health out-
comes, beginning in the early 1990s.*
Fourth, and related to the previous point, concerns
about the quality and safety of health care services
persist, even as evidence-based best practices, in
the form of clinical guidelines and in research
publications, have been well established.†  EBM
has been propelled by a growing recognition that
all medical interventions carry risks and that
these risks must be managed in light of the ben-
efits conveyed by the intervention.
Last, the rate of increase in health care spending,
fueled in great part by health care innovations
and the increasing intensity of services provided
to each patient, has caused public and private
payers and health plans to increase their scru-
tiny of new interventions before deeming them
eligible for coverage or inclusion in the plan.
* John E.Wennberg, Elliott Fisher, and Jonathan  Skinner, “Geogra-
phy and the Debate over Medicare Reform,” Health Affairs,  web
exclusive, February 13, 2002, pp. W96–114, available at
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w2.96v1/DC1;
Elliott S. Fisher et al., “The Implications of Regional Variations in
Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with
Care.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 138, no. 4 (February 18, 2003),
pp. 288–298.
† E. A. McGlynn et al., “The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults
in the United States,” New England Journal of Medicine, 348, no.
26, (June 26, 2003), pp. 2635–2645; Steven M. Asch et al., “Who is
at Greatest Risk for Receiving Poor-Quality Health Care?” New
England Journal of Medicine, 354, no. 11 (March 16, 2006), pp.
1147–1156.
Evidence-Based Medicine and
Value-Based Coverage Policy:
Not Entirely New
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as screening tests and immunizations) initially were not covered by pri-
vate health insurance or Medicare, a justification for including them in
health plans was needed.
The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force
In 1987, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) was established
as an independent federal advisory committee under the auspices of the
U.S. Public Health Service, with a mandate to review and synthesize evi-
dence about clinical preventive services and to create practice guidelines
for primary care physicians. The USPSTF developed standards for pre-
senting evidence of effectiveness for specific services such as screening
tests, patient education, and behavioral interventions. The first USPSTF
published its Guide to Clinical Preventive Services: Assessment of the Effec-
tiveness of 169 Interventions in 1989. The impact of this guide on the new
discipline of EBM was significant. The explicit criteria for the quality and
strength of research evidence underlying the task force recommendations
helped to set a research agenda for filling in gaps in the existing evidence
base. The guide also contributed to the trend away from expert consen-
sus-based clinical guidelines and toward ones grounded in the system-
atic evaluation of clinical epidemiological research.11
A second USPSTF was established in 1990 to review and incorporate more
recent outcomes studies, and a third was convened in 1998. The recom-
mendations of this latest task force incorporate, for the first time, infor-
mation about the relative cost-effectiveness of particular services.12
DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Evidence-based medicine and the economic evaluation of health care in-
terventions are closely related to health technology assessment. Health
technology assessment, once limited to the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA’s) pharmaceuticals review and approval process
focused on safety, has become an important analytic tool in the funding
and coverage of health care services. The concurrent and intertwined de-
velopment of evidence-based medicine and health technology assessment
has led to the interest in and debates about value-based coverage today.
The FDA’s Initial Role
The FDA is charged with determining the safety and efficacy of new drugs
and devices as a condition of licensing them for sale. The Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938 established the FDA with the mandate to
determine the safety of new pharmaceuticals before they could enter in-
terstate commerce. In 1962, an amendment to the act required manufac-
turers to establish the effectiveness of new drugs, in addition to their safety.
A further amendment of the FDCA in 1976 extended the scope of the
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FDA’s technology assessment role to the regulation of new medical de-
vices. (The original FDCA limited the FDA role regarding medical de-
vices to removing any from the market that were proven to be dangerous
or fraudulent.) The 1976 device provision of the FDCA required “valid
scientific evidence” of new devices, while limiting the FDA to reviewing
only high-risk devices. A crucial provision of the amendment exempts
any new device from FDA review that is “substantially equivalent” to
one that had been introduced prior to 1976. In fact, the great majority (90
percent) of all new devices enter the market under this provision.13
The standard of effectiveness employed by the FDA in evaluating new
drugs is minimal. New therapeutic agents must be assessed in (usually at
least two) randomized clinical trials against a placebo, to
demonstrate the existence of a therapeutic effect, rather than
to demonstrate greater or even equivalent therapeutic effect
against the prevailing therapy (a drug already in use, for
example). Following the introduction of approved drugs and
devices into the health care marketplace, the FDA requires manufactur-
ers to conduct post-marketing surveillance to develop additional infor-
mation on adverse events, side effects, and contraindications associated
with their use that did not surface in pre-approval trials and uses. The
vast majority of the FDA’s resources, however, are devoted to preapproval
review rather than postmarketing surveillance.
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment:
Focus for a New Field
The genesis of the formal practice of health technology assessment (beyond
the FDA’s limited role) is often traced to the work of the Health Program
within the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).14 Congress estab-
lished OTA in 1972 to serve the legislative branch as an independent source
of information and analysis about complex scientific and technical issues.
OTA construed health technology broadly, including “all elements of medi-
cal practice that are knowledge-based, including hardware (e.g., equipment
and facilities) and software (e.g., knowledge skills).…the set of techniques,
drugs, equipment, and procedures used by health-care professionals in
delivering medical care to individuals and the systems within which such
care is delivered.”15 Over its 22-year life, OTA not only conducted in-depth
studies of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of specific technologies
and health care interventions, it also developed the broader framework to
structure those individual assessments.
In 1978, Congress also authorized creation of the National Center for
Health Care Technology within the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS). The center’s role was advisory and informational: to
provide information to state and local health care facilities planning au-
thorities, to advise the Medicare program regarding coverage of new tech-
nologies, to set priorities for health technology assessment research, and
The 1976 device provision of the
FDCA required “valid scientific
evidence” of new devices.
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to develop improved methods for health technology assessment.16 The
center operated for three years before it was reincarnated as the Office of
Health Technology Assessment (OHTA) within the National Center for
Health Services Research (NCHSR), another DHHS agency. OHTA’s more
circumscribed role was to advise the Medicare program on coverage of
new technologies, helping to determine when a new intervention was no
longer experimental but rather standard medical practice. Despite this
limited charge, the influence of OHTA (and of its successor agencies) ex-
tended beyond Medicare; private insurers and health plans tended to fol-
low Medicare’s determinations about when interventions crossed the line
from experimental to standard practice.17
Evolution from NCHSR to
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
In 1989, Congress authorized the Agency for Health Care Policy and Re-
search (AHCPR) to succeed the NCHSR (including OHTA), and invested
the agency with a new charge: to develop, disseminate, and evaluate clini-
cal practice guidelines. To this end, AHCPR established the Forum on
Quality and Effectiveness in Health Care, which convened experts from
both the public and private sectors to develop practice guidelines.
AHCPR’s original mandate emphasized reducing variations in medical
practice and outcomes. The agency was given a much larger annual bud-
get than its predecessors, almost $100 million, of which two-fifths was
earmarked for the development of clinical practice guidelines and medi-
cal effectiveness research.18 Although cost containment had not been ex-
plicit in its original charge, AHCPR’s reauthorization in 1992 directed the
agency to incorporate cost-effectiveness information into its technology
assessments and to consider costs in developing practice guidelines.19 This
expansion in the scope of AHCPR’s evaluation activities to include cost
effectiveness contributed to the circumstances that resulted in Congress’s
displeasure with the agency three years later.
The first of three Institute of Medicine (IOM) committees to address the
development of clinical practice guidelines was tasked by AHCPR with
helping to chart a course and propose methodological standards for the
Forum’s work, in accordance with the agency’s legislative mandate. The
IOM committee described the state of the art of practice guidelines devel-
opment as progressing, but with “deficiencies in method, scope, and sub-
stance.” 20 It noted a proliferation of guidelines without a coordinative
mechanism to resolve inconsistencies and evaluative quality. Two years
later, a second IOM committee issued recommendations for using clinical
practice guidelines as evaluative tools to improve quality of care, involve
practitioners in devising applications, and regularly review and update
guidelines. The committee also outlined a research and evaluation strat-
egy for the refinement of guideline development and implementation.21
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A third IOM committee later recommended a strategy for AHCPR to set
priorities for guidelines development and proposed that the agency
establish a clearinghouse to identify and disseminate clinical practice
guidelines developed by other organizations. The committee hesitated to
assign AHCPR the added task of evaluating the soundness of such guide-
lines, however, and instead recommended further testing of assessment
tools and criteria.22 In the same year that this third IOM report was is-
sued, AHCPR’s very existence was threatened, in part as a result of the
politically effective opposition mounted by a well-organized group of
orthopedic surgeons to practice guidelines for the treatment of low-back
pain that the agency had issued.23 Congress slashed the agency’s 1996
budget by about 20 percent, reducing it to $125 million.
AHRQ: A NEW APPROACH
In 1999, Congress reauthorized and renamed AHCPR, expanding the
agency’s charge to include (i) evaluation of the cost and use of health care
services and access to services and (ii) promotion of evidence-based health
care practices. At the same time,
it redefined the role of the DHHS
technology assessment agency
with respect to clinical practice
guidelines. The stance that
AHCPR’s successor, the Agency
for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ), takes in regard to clinical practice guidelines reflects the
hesitation that the IOM committee expressed a decade ago and—even
more—its near-death experience. The agency’s role in guideline develop-
ment now consists in the production of the underlying information about
effective interventions through evidence reports and technology assess-
ments. AHRQ also supports research on effective clinical practices and dis-
semination of guidelines through the National Guideline Clearinghouse. 24
Evidence-Based Practice Centers
AHRQ’s activities to promote evidence-based health care practices are
organized around its support of 13 Evidence-based Practice Centers
(EPCs), typically university-affiliated organizations that prepare “science
syntheses,” evidence reports and technology assessments, on specific clini-
cal topics. These products can then serve as the basis for practice guide-
lines, performance measures, and educational materials devised by other
agencies and organizations.25 The first 12 EPCs were established by AHCPR
in 1997, with five-year contracts. In 2002, a second round of contracts was
awarded to 13 EPCs, including three first-time awards. Each of the EPCs
has particular expertise in one or more area of clinical practice or evalua-
tion methodology. Three of the EPCs specialize in conducting technology
assessments for the Medicare program, and another one primarily sup-
ports the work of the USPSTF.
AHRQ’s role in guideline development consists in the
production of the underlying information about ef-
fective interventions through evidence reports and
technology assessments.
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Topics for EPC reviews can be proposed by professional societies, health
systems, insurers, employers, providers, and consumer groups. AHRQ so-
licits topic nominations annually through a notice in the Federal Register,
but accepts them at any time. Evidence reports and technology assessments
generally take about 15 months to complete and publish. These reports and
assessments do not make clinical or coverage recommendations.26
A New Collaboration with CMS:
The Effective Healthcare Program
AHRQ oversees several programs in addition to the work of the EPCs.
The Effective Healthcare Program, authorized by Section 1013 of the Medi-
care Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(MMA), was launched in 2005 with a $15 million budget. The Effective
Healthcare Program encompasses a research network to generate evidence
of clinical effectiveness, in addition to the synthesis of existing research
by the EPCs. Section 1013 of the MMA directs AHRQ to conduct or support
research, demonstrations, and evaluations to improve the quality, effec-
tiveness, and efficiency of Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program. Research supported by the Effective Healthcare
Program is to focus on health outcomes, comparative clinical effective-
ness, and appropriateness of services and items such as pharmaceuticals,
including their organization, management, and delivery. Research results
are to be made widely available, through print and electronic media, to
an audience that includes private health plans, pharmaceutical benefits
programs, health care providers, and the general public, in addition to
the federal and state health financing programs. As directed by the au-
thorizing legislation, the Secretary identified ten priority conditions for
initial study under this program.
This list was developed and published at the end of 2004, after considering
testimony from the public and stakeholders at a “listening session” earlier in
the year and written comments submitted to the Department of Health and
Human Services.27 It reflects the program’s initial focus on the elderly and
disabled Medicare population and on conditions involving drug therapies.
The network of 13 research centers contracted with AHRQ to address
these priorities and complement the work of the Evidence-based Practice
Centers is called DEcIDE (Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about
Effectiveness). These 13 centers include academic, clinic-based, and prac-
tice-based research groups that have access to electronic health informa-
tion databases, primarily electronic health records, with which to address
questions of health outcomes and comparative clinical effectiveness. The
research centers may engage in methodological studies, comparisons of
health outcomes using secondary databases, evaluations of formulary
structure on outcomes, analysis of existing disease registries or prescrip-
tion databases, prospective studies of health outcomes, and evaluation of
drug therapy decision-making tools.28
Initial Priority Conditions
of the Effective
Healthcare Program
■ Ischemic heart disease
■ Cancer
■ Chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease/asthma
■ Stroke, including control
of hypertension
■ Arthritis and non-traumatic
joint disorders
■ Diabetes mellitus
■ Dementia, including
Alzheimer’s disease
■ Pneumonia
■ Peptic ulcer/dyspepsia
■ Depression and other
mood disorders
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Pharmaceutical Outcomes Research
AHRQ and its predecessor agency have funded research relating to drug
therapies since 1992. AHRQ’s pharmaceutical outcomes program now
consists of the Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics
(CERTS), 11 academically based research centers and a Coordinating Cen-
ter (at Duke University). The CERTS program was first authorized as part
of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 and then
expanded in AHRQ’s authorizing legislation in 1999. The CERTS research
program has three basic aims: (i) to increase awareness of the uses and
the risks of new drugs, combinations of drugs, and devices, and of ways
to promote their appropriate use; (ii) to provide clinical information to all
interested parties, including patients, providers, and third-party payers;
and (iii) to improve quality and reduce the cost of health care by increas-
ing appropriate drug use and safety.29
AHRQ’s Delivery-System-Based Research and
Demonstration Networks
In addition to the programs and activities described above, AHRQ also
supports a number of practice-based, delivery-oriented research, demon-
stration, and evaluation projects. These include the Integrated Delivery
System Research Network and its follow-on program, Accelerating Change
and Transformation in Organizations and Networks (ACTION), with 15
collaborative initiatives, and the Primary Care Practice-based Research
Networks. The focus of these initiatives is applied research and the dis-
semination and prompt adoption of innovative practices and evidence-
based products, tools, and strategies.30
MEDICARE COVERAGE POLICY
Medicare has dual systems for determining coverage policy: local deci-
sions made by the roughly 50 regional fiscal intermediaries and carriers
that pay hospitals, physicians, and other service providers on behalf of
Medicare, which may vary in detail and timing of coverage from place to
place, and decisions made by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) that apply nationally. CMS reports that about 90 percent of
all coverage determinations are made at the local level; only about 18 to
24 national coverage decisions are made in a given year.31 This structure
for coverage policy is rooted in the original design of the Medicare pro-
gram to limit the influence and role of government in medical practice. It
has survived because of the medical technology industry’s support of lo-
cal coverage determinations, which are perceived as more responsive and
timely than the national coverage determination process. However, a com-
prehensive analysis of local Medicare coverage decisions as of 2001 con-
cluded that the local process was not necessarily quicker than national
coverage decisions and recommended greater standardization of cover-
age policies, at least for new technologies and technology extensions.32
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CMS describes Medicare’s national coverage process as follows:
Medicare coverage is limited to items and services that are reasonable
and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury (and
within the scope of a Medicare benefit category). National coverage de-
terminations (NCDs) are made through an evidence-based process, with
opportunities for public participation. In some cases, CMS’ own research
is supplemented by an outside technology assessment and/or consulta-
tion with the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee (MCAC). In the
absence of a national coverage policy, an item or service may be covered
at the discretion of the Medicare contractors based on a local coverage
determination (LCD).33
Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee
Before 1999, Medicare followed no formal process or standard for publica-
tion or comment in national coverage determinations.34 Coverage decisions
were conveyed through updates to the program’s policy manual, which
governed the actions of its contractors, the Medicare Part A (hospital) fiscal
intermediaries and Part B (physician) carriers. Since April 1999 all coverage
decisions have been posted on the program’s Web site, along with back-
ground information on the issue and the rationale for the decision.35
The MCAC was chartered late in 1998 to advise the Secretary of Health
and Human Services whether specific items and services are reasonable
and necessary under Medicare law.36 Only a few national coverage issues
are referred to the MCAC for a recommendation. The MCAC serves as a
forum in which complex or controversial issues, proposals, and questions
can be examined as openly as possible. It provides a setting and process
for the presentation of evidence, deliberation, and a public exchange of
views about a given coverage issue.
The MCAC was originally designed to operate with a number of special-
ized panels, with representatives from each panel serving on the MCAC
executive committee. In the absence of explicit guidance from the Health
Care Financing Administration (CMS’s predecessor) on how the MCAC
should operate, the executive committee tasked a working group to cre-
ate interim operating principles. The document that the working group
presented to the executive committee articulated the MCAC’s role as de-
termining whether there was adequate evidence to conclude that a treat-
ment was effective. The standards of evidence outlined in the document,
however, created concern among the medical technology industry, which
led to congressional action to define the MCAC’s role and to eliminate the
structure of specialized panels.37
Under its current charter, the committee may consist of up to 100 members,
who are selected for their expertise in a variety of health-related fields.38 A
maximum of 88 members are voting members, and the additional 12 non-
voting members (equally divided) may represent consumer or industry
interests. No more than 15 members, including one representative each
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from industry and consumer groups, attend a given meeting, based on their
particular knowledge regarding the matters under consideration. The
MCAC meets between four and eight times during a given year.
Assessing New Technologies for the Medicare Program
Another resource (in addition to seeking the advice of the MCAC) that CMS
can employ in making national coverage determinations is to commission
a technology assessment from another
agency or organization. Whether con-
ducted in-house or commissioned exter-
nally, technology assessments to support
a national coverage determination always
include a systematic review of the pub-
lished evidence about health outcomes re-
lated to the intervention in question. In cases in which CMS concludes that
it needs assistance because the body of evidence to review is extensive,
conflicting, or requires special expertise not available from staff, it typically
turns to AHRQ to either conduct the technology assessment directly or
assign the task to one of AHRQ’s Evidence-based Practice Centers.
National Coverage Determinations
Requests for a coverage decision can originate with anyone, including
practitioners, manufacturers, beneficiaries, or contractors. The MMA re-
vised and codified several aspects of the Medicare national coverage deter-
mination process, effective January 2004. It established timeliness standards
for the issuance of coverage determinations following receipt of a formal
request. For requests that do not require an externally conducted technol-
ogy assessment or review by the MCAC, the deadline for making a draft
of the proposed national coverage determination available to the public
is six months following the date of a request. If Medicare program admin-
istrators decide that an external technology assessment or MCAC review
is needed to inform a coverage decision, CMS has nine months in which
to make a draft of the proposed national coverage determination avail-
able to the public. A 30-day public comment period follows publication
of the proposed coverage determination on the CMS Web site. Sixty days
following the close of the comment period, the Medicare program issues
a final decision.
Coverage with Evidence Development
Over the past several years, Medicare has adopted several policies to pro-
mote the development of evidence for coverage decisions involving new
technologies. Since September 2000, Medicare has paid for the costs of
routine care for patients in clinical trials, making the undertaking of such
studies less costly for those supporting the innovative research. Medicare
Technology assessments to support a national
coverage determination always include a sys-
tematic review of the published evidence
about health outcomes.
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 16
will also pay for certain experimental devices during the period over which
they are being evaluated in clinical trials under an investigational device
exemption (IDE) policy.39
In some cases of promising technologies that do not meet Medicare’s stan-
dards for national coverage, Medicare has construed “reasonable and
necessary” to make coverage conditional on providing the intervention
in the context of a clinical research study. The most notable example of
this is the National Emphysema Treatment Trial (NETT), in which the
benefits, costs, and risks of lung volume reduction surgery for patients
with severe emphysema were evaluated over a seven-year period (1997
to 2003). The clinical trial itself was sponsored by the National Institutes
of Health and AHRQ, but Medicare paid for all the clinical costs of care
associated with it.40 The results of this study ultimately led to Medicare
coverage of lung volume reduction surgery for only that subset of pa-
tients for whom benefit had been demonstrated.
More recently, Medicare has made several additional national coverage
decisions in favor of new technologies contingent on further evidence
development. These include the following:
■ Off-label uses of colorectal cancer drugs within several clinical trials
sponsored by the National Cancer Institute
■ PET scans for patients with suspected dementia who are part of a clini-
cal trial (not necessarily randomized)
■ Implantable cardioverter defibrillators, with submission of data to a
clinical registry to ensure the defibrillator was provided in a reason-
able and necessary manner and for subsequent analysis of risks, ben-
efits, and indications for use
In July 2006, CMS issued a guidance document that describes those instances
in which CMS may issue a national coverage determination that provides
coverage for an item or service only in the context of additional data collec-
tion—a concept labeled coverage with evidence development (CED).41 This
guidance document defines two variations of CED. The first, coverage with
appropriateness determination (CAD), describes instances in which CMS
determines that an item or service is nationally covered but requires more
information to ensure that it is provided in the manner prescribed in the
national coverage determination. The guidance document mentions the
following four concerns that may result in CAD as a condition of coverage:
(i) “if the newly covered item or service should be restricted to patients
with specific conditions and criteria,” (ii) “if the newly covered item or ser-
vice should be restricted for use by providers with specific training or cre-
dentials,” (iii) “if there is concern among clinical thought leaders that there
are substantial opportunities for misuse of the item or service,” and (iv) “if
the coverage determination significantly changes how providers manage
patients who use this newly covered item or service.”
Continued on p. 18 ➤
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 17
In 1987, as a conse-
quence of a legal settle-
ment with a Medicare
beneficiary who sued
for reimbursement of
an angioplasty proce-
dure performed prior
to a coverage determination, the Medicare program
published its first notice explaining its coverage
process. Two years later, a second Federal Register
notice in the form of a proposed rule expanded
upon the earlier one. The 1989 notice proposed,
for the first time in Medicare’s history, that a cost-
effectiveness criterion be applied. Further devel-
opment of the policy was immediately subject to
delays as a result of opposition from professional
and industry groups. An effort to issue the pro-
posed rule in final form in 1996 met with substan-
tial opposition, and the 1989 notice was finally
withdrawn in 2000.
In 2000, a Medicare notice of intent was published
that proposed criteria for determining which items
and services are “reasonable and necessary.” The
criteria included demonstrable medical benefit
and added value. The notion of “added value” im-
plied that, in the case of two or more similar tech-
nologies used for the same purpose that are
equally beneficial, only the lowest-cost approach
would be covered.* This criterion of added value
proved controversial, however, and CMS an-
nounced, in a September 2003 Federal Register no-
tice, that it did not intend to develop a proposed
rule based on the notice of intent.† Forestalling any
further efforts to issue regulations to govern cov-
erage decisions, Section 731 of the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement and Modernization
Act of 2003 directed CMS to publish factors con-
sidered in the process for making national cover-
age determinations as “guidances.”‡
CMS complied in 2006 with publication of guid-
ance on the circumstances under which a national
coverage determination is sought and when an
external technology assessment is commissioned.
It includes the following disclaimers:
Cost effectiveness is not a factor CMS con-
siders in making NCDs [national coverage de-
terminations]. In other words, the cost of a
particular technology is not relevant in the
determination of whether the technology im-
proves health outcomes or should be covered
for the Medicare population through an NCD.§
TAs [technology assessments] are, and will
continue to be, focused on clinical factors per-
tinent to beneficiaries’ health outcomes. Fur-
thermore, while economic considerations
may be a factor discussed in a technology
assessment, the primary purpose of a TA is
to evaluate the clinical and scientific evidence
pertaining to the clinical benefits and risks
of the technology, and cost is not a factor in
our review or decision to cover a particular
technology.¶
Although Medicare’s administrative policies gov-
erning coverage determinations have not included
cost-effectiveness criteria, cost-effectiveness has
been important when legislative action has been
required to expand Medicare coverage for spe-
cific preventive services, such as influenza and
pneumococcal immunizations, colorectal cancer
screening, and osteoporosis screening.
* Sean R. Tunis and Jeffrey L. Kang, “Improvements in Medicare Coverage of New Technology,” Health Affairs, 20, no. 5, (September/October
2001), pp. 83–85.
† U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), “Notice of Revised Process for Making National Coverage Determinations,” Federal
Register, vol. 68, no. 187 (September 26, 2003), pp. 55634–55641.
‡ DHHS, “Procedure for Producing Guidance Documents Describing Medicare’s Coverage Process,” Federal Register, vol. 69, no. 185 (Septem-
ber 24, 2004), pp. 57325–57326.
§ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), “Guidance for the Public, Industry, and CMS Staff: Factors CMS Considers in Opening a
National Coverage Determination” April 11, 2006; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=6.
¶ CMS, “Guidance for the Public, Industry, and CMS Staff: Factors CMS Considers in Commissioning External Technology Assessments,” April
11, 2006; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=7.
Stymied Attempts
to Incorporate
Cost-Effectiveness
Criteria in Medicare
Coverage Policies
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Continued from p. 16
A second type of CED described in the guidance document is termed cov-
erage with study participation (CSP). Under CSP, CMS will allow cover-
age of certain items or services for which the evidence is not adequate to
support national coverage and where additional data would further clarify
the health impact of these items and services for Medicare beneficiaries.
In the past, this level of evidence would have prompted non-coverage
decisions. The document lists some of the evidentiary findings that might
lead to this decision:
■ Available evidence may be a product of otherwise methodologically
rigorous evaluations but may not have evaluated outcomes that are
relevant to Medicare beneficiaries.
■ The available clinical research may have failed to address adequately
the risks and benefits to Medicare beneficiaries of off-label or other
unanticipated uses of a drug, biologic, service, or device.
■ Available clinical research studies may not have included specific pa-
tient  subgroups or patients with disease characteristics that are highly
prevalent in the Medicare population.
■ New applications may exist for diagnostic services and devices that
are already on the market, but there is little or no published research
that supports a determination of reasonable and necessary for Medi-
care coverage at the time of the request for an NCD.
■ Sufficient evidence about the health benefits of a given item or service
to support a reasonable and necessary determination is available only
for a subgroup of Medicare patients with specific clinical criteria and/
or for providers with certain experience or other qualifications. Other
patient subgroups or providers require additional evidence to deter-
mine if the item or service is reasonable and necessary.
PRIVATE-SECTOR AND STATE INITIATIVES
Technology assessments have a public good aspect that works against
private-sector endeavors in this field. Investments in developing new
knowledge about effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of specific services
and coverage policies cannot easily be kept confidential (and thus mo-
nopolized) to preserve the competitive advantage of the organization
making the investment in new information. In a centrally financed and
administered or regulated health services sector, economies of scale can
be realized with a coordinated technology assessment and evidence de-
velopment process. This model is exemplified in the British National
Health Service. Still, despite potential “free riders,” both private-sector
organizations and state agencies in the United States support technology
assessment activities.
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 19
Blue Cross Blue Shield Association’s
Technology Evaluation Center
Established in 1985, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association’s Technology
Evaluation Center (TEC) was one of the first private-sector agencies de-
voted to assessing evidence of the clinical effectiveness of new technolo-
gies. The center conducts 20 to 25 assessments each year evaluating specific
technologies in terms of their clini-
cal effectiveness and appropriate-
ness. Assessments are produced by
TEC’s core staff and reviewed and
authorized by a Medical Advisory
Panel of nationally regarded ex-
perts. The advisory panel of 19
members meets three times yearly. In 1993, TEC began a collaboration with
Kaiser Permanente. As part of this joint effort, Kaiser experts have served
as advisors to TEC and sit on its Medical Advisory Panel. TEC has also
served as an AHRQ-supported Evidence-based Practice Center since 1997.
TEC employs a set of five criteria to assess health interventions, including
drugs, devices, and procedures:
■ A technology must be approved by the appropriate governmental
regulatory body (typically FDA).
■ Scientific evidence must support judgments about the intervention’s
effect on health outcomes.
■ The intervention’s beneficial effects should outweigh any harmful ef-
fects, and thus improve the net health outcome.
■ The intervention must be as beneficial as any established alternatives.
■ The intervention’s benefits must be achievable under the usual condi-
tions of medical practice.42
Assessment reports follow a specific format. While they may include
analyses of cost-effectiveness or compare the relative effectiveness of dif-
ferent clinical approaches, they always evaluate whether the interven-
tion improves health outcomes such as length of life, quality of life, and
functional abilities.
Until 2003, the center’s assessments were available only to subscribing
members. Since then, however, final technology assessment reports have
been posted publicly. As with the recommendations of the MCAC, re-
ports of the TEC are advisory only; TEC evidence evaluations are sepa-
rate from coverage decisions, which are made by individual health plans.
Drug Formularies
In 1998, Regence Blue Shield in Washington State became the first U.S.
health insurance organization to require economic evidence as a condition
The Blue Cross Blue Shield Association’s Technol-
ogy Evaluation Center was one of the first private-
sector agencies devoted to assessing evidence of
the clinical effectiveness of new technologies.
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of formulary review.43 This initiative became the precedent for guide-
lines promulgated by the Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy in 2001
for drug manufacturers’ submissions of evidence of effectiveness, safety,
and value for formulary inclusion. Such standards not only serve to sig-
nal the kinds of information that health care plans consider essential for
making formulary decisions, they also reduce the uncertainties and costs
that manufacturers face in preparing documentation for coverage reviews
by multiple health plans.
In recent years, the federal-state Medicaid program has accounted for
roughly 20 percent of national spending for prescription drugs: almost
$34 billion in 2003. As of 2005, 34 state Medicaid programs used some
form of preferred drug lists or restrictive for-
mularies in administering their prescription
drug benefit.44 The Oregon Medicaid program
led the way with the use of evidence in for-
mulary design with the Drug Effectiveness Re-
view Project (DERP). Since 2001, Oregon has
commissioned systematic analyses of drug ef-
fectiveness by therapeutic classes from the Evidence-based Practice Cen-
ter at Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) to inform decisions
about the inclusion of specific therapeutic agents in its Medicaid drug
formulary. Only therapeutic agents within a class for which there is evi-
dence of effectiveness in actual clinical practice (and not just in research
settings) are included.45 In 2003, other states were invited to join with Or-
egon in supporting DERP. As of 2006, 15 states are participating in sup-
port of DERP, primarily through their Medicaid agencies.46
DERP reviews are now produced not only by the Oregon EPC, but also
by others in California and North Carolina. The project plans to complete
review of 25 therapeutic classes over a three-year period. Each review is
updated for new evidence every 7 to 24 months. The reviews answer ques-
tions in three broad categories: (i) how drugs within a given class com-
pare in overall effectiveness, (ii) how drugs within a given class compare
in terms of safety and adverse events, and (iii) how safety and effective-
ness profiles for a specific drug may differ for subpopulations.
DERP reports do not include cost information. Reports are made publicly
available without charge on the project’s Web site. AARP and Consumers
Union have created consumer-oriented summaries of DERP reviews and
have posted these summaries on their open Web sites.47 Just this year, a
companion program to DERP, the Medicaid Evidence-based Decisions
Project (MED) was launched at OHSU to provide states with access to
systematic reviews, technology assessments, an interactive Web-based in-
formation clearinghouse, and information and analyses tailored to the
state’s particular circumstances.48
As of 2005, 34 state Medicaid programs
used some form of preferred drug lists or
restrictive formularies in administering
their prescription drug benefit.
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THE BRITISH NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR HEALTH AND CLINICAL EXCELLENCE (NICE)
By the late 1990s, the British National Health Service, probably the most
popular British institution since its establishment in 1948, was experiencing
a crisis of public confidence in the way resource allocation decisions were
made.49 First, the public became increasingly aware of disparities in the
availability of new pharmaceuticals and other technologies across regions—
dubbed “postcode prescribing”—as a result of differences in funding pri-
orities and decisions by local health authorities with fixed annual budgets
for all NHS services within a given area. Second, the budgetary pressures
created by continued advances and growth in health care technologies ap-
peared to threaten the financial sustainability of the NHS. These distinct
yet related concerns provided the impetus for the creation of NICE in 1999.50
NICE was constituted as a Special
Health Authority within the NHS to
promote clinical excellence and the ef-
fective use of available resources in the
health service. Its original charge was to
(i) conduct technology appraisals of drugs, devices, diagnostic techniques,
surgical procedures, and health promotion interventions; (ii) develop
clinical practice guidelines, taking into account both the effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of particular interventions with respect to spe-
cific health conditions; (iii) determine the safety and effectiveness of
interventional (that is, invasive and radiological) procedures; and (iv)
develop clinical audit methodologies. In 2005, NICE was also tasked to
develop public health guidance on the effectiveness and cost-effective-
ness of individual interventions and programmatic strategies to improve
population health.51
NICE has quasi-independent status within the NHS. The directors of the
institute’s governing board are elected by an independent appointments
commission. The institute employs about 200 staff in all capacities. NICE
reported a budget of 27.7 million pounds for its most recent annual pe-
riod, 2005–2006.52 Three centers within the institute develop guidance for
NHS programs and providers: the Centre for Public Health Excellence,
which develops guidance on public health programs and interventions;
the Centre for Health Technology Evaluation, which conducts technol-
ogy appraisals and evaluates interventional procedures; and the Centre
for Clinical Practice, which develops clinical guidelines.
Technology Appraisal Process
NICE’s technology appraisal process affects the adoption of new tech-
nologies, including pharmaceuticals, by local health authorities of the NHS.
The topics that NICE addresses in its technology appraisals are selected
by the Department of Health, the agency that administers the NHS. Topics
"Postcode prescribing" and budgetary pres-
sures, distinct yet related concerns, provided
the impetus for the creation of NICE.
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may be proposed by a variety of individuals and groups, including health
professionals, patients and the general public, clinical directors within
the Department of Health, manufacturers, and the National Horizon Scan-
ning Centre of the University of Birmingham, a group that tracks emerg-
ing technologies.53 Together, NICE and the department define the scope
of the technology assessment.54
Technology appraisals are conducted by multidisciplinary committees
convened by NICE. These committees include experts from academia and
the NHS, with the support of core institute staff. Organizations repre-
senting stakeholders (for example, patients, health professionals, and
manufacturers) can be involved in the appraisal process as “consultees” to
provide information to the Appraisal Committee and review draft guid-
ance. A technology assessment report (TAR), a systematic review of
evidence, serves as the starting point for a technology appraisal. NICE
commissions such assessment reports from one of eight independent aca-
demic groups.55 External contracts, including payments to NICE’s col-
laborating centers, account for 38 percent of NICE’s annual budget.56
Preparing a TAR takes from six months to one year.
Recently, however, NICE initiated a fast track for single products (the single
technology assessment, or STA, process), which has cut the time needed
for review by half. In an STA, the manufacturer’s submission serves as the
principal source of evidence. Evidence review groups (the same academic
groups that produce TARs) review and critique the submission.
After receiving the TAR, the Appraisal Committee considers it, along with
additional information supplied by manufacturers and other interested
parties. In addition to the findings of the systematic evidence review, the
ultimate technology appraisal reflects equity considerations (such as fair
treatment of people across the age spectrum and with different health con-
ditions) and political and institutional judgments.57 After reviewing all
materials submitted to NICE, the Appraisal Committee issues a provisional
determination. This is sent to the interested parties for comment. The com-
mittee then reviews comments and makes a determination. This determi-
nation can be appealed before NICE issues its guidance to the NHS.
Shortly after its establishment, NICE published guidelines for manufactur-
ers and sponsors submitting evidence. These guidelines covered the pre-
sentation of information about clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and
wider impacts on the NHS of a funding decision. The guidelines were later
revised to further standardize submissions of evidence. The guidelines now
specify that the perspective from which economic evaluations are conducted
be that of the public decision maker, that is, as valued for the population as
a whole, and that the intervention (for example, drug) being assessed should
be compared to the most commonly used alternative intervention.58
NICE conducts 30 to 50 appraisals annually. In its appraisals and recom-
mendations NICE is not responsible for considering affordability, that is,
the overall budgetary impact of a newly introduced intervention on a
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health authority. Regional administrators of the NHS have budget caps
that affect their decisions about purchase and deployment of expensive
equipment. Since 2002, if NICE determines that a new, expensive tech-
nology is cost-effective, NHS authorities in England and Wales must make
resources available to finance the provision of that intervention for its
approved indications within three months of NICE’s determination (un-
less a specific exception is issued by the Minister of Health). However,
this directive is not always followed.59 Since 2001, all evidence considered
by NICE is made public.
The NHS maintains an Economic Evaluation Database that identifies, sum-
marizes, and critiques evidence from published studies that include eco-
nomic information about clinical interventions. This database is employed
in technology appraisals. The preferred outcome measure for reporting
cost-effectiveness results is cost-per-quality-adjusted-life-year (cost per
QALY). Although students of NICE have observed that recommended
interventions tend to have a cost per QALY at or below roughly $31,000
to $46,000, NICE does not impose an explicit cost-effectiveness cutoff
value.60 Factors that are considered in addition to the intervention’s esti-
mated cost-effectiveness include, for example, the availability of any other
interventions for the condition involved and equity concerns.61
NICE has operated, in its relatively
short tenure, during a period of
steady growth in NHS funding.62 At
some point, however, the rate of in-
crease in NHS resources almost inevi-
tably will slow and NICE will have to
answer for its funding recommendations to local health authorities fac-
ing tighter budget constraints. The NICE technology appraisal process
has earned credibility because of its rigorous scientific review process and
the transparency of its procedures and deliberations. A World Health Or-
ganization review of the NICE program over its first four years concluded
that NICE had led the field internationally in innovations in technology
appraisals—but also noted that NICE had been operating in a fiscal and
policy environment that supported the approval of new, cost-effective
medicines and technologies.63
The transparency of NICE’s appraisal decisions has increased opportuni-
ties to challenge the legitimacy of NHS funding decisions.64 NICE has been
criticized for being too quick to approve expensive interventions.65 At the
same time, it has been accused of slowing the adoption of new drugs and
technologies by declining to recommend that local health authorities pay
for them.66 Glaxo-Wellcome sought coverage approval for a new drug to
treat the symptoms of influenza (zanamivir, or Relenza) prior to the 1999–
2000 flu season. NICE initially recommended against funding zanamivir
because of its relatively high cost for a small benefit. Health technology
agencies around the world followed NICE’s lead and declined to cover
the drug.67 NICE reversed its decision for specific high-risk patients in
The NICE technology appraisal process has earned
credibility because of its rigorous scientific review
process and the transparency of its procedures
and deliberations.
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November 2000, when additional clinical and economic evidence demon-
strating the cost-effectiveness of zanamivir in these patients became avail-
able. NICE can err either by determining that an intervention is valuable
(and cost-effective) when it is not or by determining that an intervention
should not be funded when, in fact, it would be cost-effective to provide it.
Both types of errors carry risks of patient welfare and misallocated resources.
Several strategies have been proposed to reform the operation of NICE.
Some of these would strengthen the institute’s ability to constrain cost
growth within the National Health Service. One such proposal is that NICE
be given a fixed “growth” budget for the net cost of new technologies.
This would require the institute to consider the aggregate budgetary im-
pact of its recommendations for funding new technologies.68 A second
proposal would require that NICE first approve all new technologies that
seek NHS funding through local health authorities, rather than just a sub-
set of new interventions, as is now the case.69 A third approach would
extend NICE’s reviews to existing interventions that may be ineffective
or inefficient—defunding them to make room in local health budgets for
effective and efficient services.70 Finally, some have urged that NICE pay
more attention to the equity implications of its recommendations and
address their distributive impacts more explicitly, particularly with re-
gard to funding services used by people of different ages.
A STUDY IN CONTRASTS (AND SIMILARITIES)
The ideal of medical practice grounded in scientifically valid evidence of
effectiveness is embraced on both sides of the Atlantic. Likewise, stan-
dards and processes for the appraisal of new interventions have grown
more demanding in both American and British settings. Advances in the
methods and application of EBM and technology assessment are the re-
sult of experiences and knowledge shared internationally.
A review of the history of technology assessment and coverage decisions
in the United States shows that these issues received attention relatively
early (late 1960s and early 1970s) as health insurance coverage expanded
and costly new technologies entered the market. It also reveals a typically
American ambivalence about economic evaluations of new technologies
and attempts to standardize medical practice during the past several de-
cades. More recently there has been a renewed interest in establishing
both a scientific basis for medical practice and the comparative effective-
ness of alternative interventions. The use of economic information, in-
cluding cost-effectiveness analysis, to evaluate innovative technologies
and practices for coverage decisions remains suspect. Nevertheless, cost-
effectiveness analysis has been applied selectively in U.S. settings—in
Veterans Administration formulary decisions and in legislation requiring
Medicare coverage of preventive services, for example.
Great Britain’s adoption of systematic technology assessment and eco-
nomic evaluation of new interventions was a response to a different set of
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pressures and concerns. NICE was established to spur the diffusion of
effective new interventions throughout the NHS. Its performance has
demonstrated that economic evaluation is not a synonym for cost control;
cost-effectiveness analysis can help to demonstrate the underuse of effec-
tive interventions as well as inappropriate or inefficient use. NICE has
also enjoyed a degree of political insularity that U.S. agencies tasked with
similar functions (OTA and AHRQ’s predecessors) did not have. It is un-
clear whether or how this independence from political pressures could be
achieved on this side of the Atlantic.
One development evident in both Great Britain and the United States is
adherence to standards of transparency and public participation in cov-
erage decisions within public programs. Over the past decade, Norman
Daniels, a moral philosopher, and James Sabin, a physician, have devel-
oped ethical principles for health care coverage decision making—in both
the public and the private sectors.71 They argue that decisions that limit
coverage and therefore access to
expensive health care interventions
can be ethical or fair if the decision-
making process meets certain con-
ditions: that coverage decisions are
based on information and reason-
ing to which all stakeholders—patients, clinicians, payers, patent hold-
ers, and manufacturers–have access (that is, the decision process is trans-
parent); that the decisions and the process by which decisions are reached
are held accountable for being reasonable to those whose interests are at
stake in the decision; and that an appeals process is in place. These crite-
ria for fair coverage decisions appear to have gained wide acceptance,
explicitly or implicitly, among public and private health plans. Increased
publicity is of course facilitated by Web-based information and commu-
nication capabilities. Nevertheless, the commitment of Medicare (with
AHRQ) and NICE to explain their decisions, consider appeals, and create
opportunities for public participation throughout their review processes
signals a genuine reform in public policymaking.
A second significant trend is the movement toward greater consistency
in and harmonization of informational and analytic standards in technol-
ogy assessments internationally. The Academy of Managed Care Phar-
macy standard format for submitting economic information on drugs for
inclusion in formularies has contributed to this trend. Perhaps it is not
surprising that manufacturers have promoted efforts to standardize such
requirements. Compliance with disparate documentation requirements
for coverage decisions by various purchasers has been frustrating and
costly for pharmaceutical and medical device companies. They have be-
come allies in efforts to define a standard approach to technology assess-
ment—including evidence of cost effectiveness—so that they can more
efficiently prepare research and analytic results for coverage reviews in
multiple national markets.
Pharmaceutical and medical device companies
have become allies in efforts to define a standard
approach to technology assessment.
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BARRIERS TO AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
VALUE-BASED COVERAGE
It may seem obvious why economic evaluation has become an integral
part of technology assessment and funding decisions within the British
National Health Service while it has remained controversial and suspect
in the United States—for public as well as for private payers:
■ Historically, the British have been more willing than Americans to ac-
cept limits to health care, and the NHS is a trusted public institution.
■ A single-payer system allows for a unified perspective on cost effec-
tiveness: the payer is society as a whole, benefits are calculated for the
entire population, and the population remains in the system over en-
tire lifetimes. In contrast, the multipayer, mixed public and private
American health care enterprise means that each payer has a different
perspective on the cost effectiveness of a particular investment or cov-
erage decision. The characteristics of each payer’s enrollees may dif-
fer in ways that affect the results of a cost-effectiveness analysis, and
turnover in enrollment within health plans makes it difficult to cap-
ture longer-term health payoffs.
It is perhaps more remarkable how similar the activities of NICE and its
affiliates are to those of U.S. centers of evidence-based practice and tech-
nology assessment. The difference is that in the United States the various
parts have not been joined together to form a unified whole; rather, each
piece functions relatively autonomously and decision making remains
dispersed among many payers. A proposal to create a national center to
develop and disseminate comparative effectiveness information has re-
cently been forwarded, in recognition that this information is a true pub-
lic good that is undersupplied in a market economy.72 Such a center could,
conceivably, knit together the technology assessment and effectiveness
research and synthesis that now is conducted by various public and pri-
vate-sector organizations.
The continuing challenges facing evidence- and value-based coverage
policy are also the same internationally. Data from well-designed clinical
trials are expensive to collect and too scarce, and useful results often be-
come available only after coverage decisions have been made. Furthermore,
innovation in medical practice is a dynamic process. The population that
receives a particular intervention changes and expands. Adaptations in the
intervention and in accepted practice may take place without explicit docu-
mentation or reexamination. These shifts in application once a new tech-
nology enters medical practice make definitive assessments of efficacy,
risk, and cost elusive.73
The data and analytic practices that underlie evidence-based medicine
and economic evaluation of health care interventions inevitably yield
results that entail a considerable degree of uncertainty.74 The range of
plausible values (confidence intervals) around point estimates of cost
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effectiveness has led some to conclude that cost-effectiveness analysis is
not helpful in making coverage decisions. The uncertainty inherent in
cost-effectiveness results is one reason why such analyses should never
be the sole basis of coverage decisions. Yet decisions about what tech-
nologies should be covered, and for whom, must and will be made by
those who pay for or administer health benefits. Others argue that con-
sidering the quality of evidence of effectiveness in a disciplined and ex-
plicit fashion—and juxtaposing the estimate of effectiveness with an esti-
mate of the resources needed to achieve the beneficial results—improves
on current implicit judgments and unsystematic coverage decisions.
The United States has avoided coming to terms with escalating health
care costs and possibly diminishing returns on investments in health care.
Perhaps more than anyone else, Americans value technological progress
in medical care. The national bias in favor of innovation, along with the
dispersion of responsibility for coverage decisions in American health care,
makes it particularly difficult to focus public attention on the consequences
of our “default” approach to allocating health care resources. When the
United States is ready to take on these issues, AHRQ’s Evidence-based Prac-
tice Centers and Effective Healthcare Program offer an infrastructure for
developing the kind of information needed. Medicare’s national coverage
decisions process offers a framework for transparent and interactive policy
development. And a model for citizen involvement in making hard choices
in health care can be found in the British NHS.75 However value-based cov-
erage fares, the United States and Great Britain are likely to continue ad-
dressing their common problems in distinctive ways.
ENDNOTES
1. “Interventions” are defined here as diagnostic services, treatments—including but not
limited to drugs, surgeries, and medical devices—and preventive and screening services.
2. Author’s calculations, based on Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS),
“Health Care System: Facts and Figures 1980-2000,” available at www.cms.hhs.gov/The
ChartSeries/03_Facts_Figures_1980_2000.asp#TopOfPage; and Laurence J. Kotlikoff and
Christian Hagist, “Who’s going broke? Comparing healthcare costs in ten OECD coun-
tries,” NBER working paper 11833, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
3. Author’s calculations, based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, “OECD Health Data 2006”; available at www.oecd.org/document/16/0,2340
,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html.
4. While many other nations with technologically developed health care systems are ac-
tive in the fields of technology assessment, evidence-based medicine, and the economic
evaluation of health care interventions, this review is limited to models and activities in the
United States and Great Britain. Canada (Province of Ontario) and Australia, in addition to
Great Britain, have been leaders in developing value-based coverage policies for pharma-
ceutical products in particular.
Endnotes / continued ➤
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 28
Endnotes / continued
5. Cynthia D. Mulrow and Kathleen N. Lohr, “Proof and Policy from Medical Research
Evidence,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 26, no. 2 (April 2001), pp. 249–266.
6. Mark Chassin, “Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality?” Milbank Quarterly, 76
(1998), pp. 565–591.
7. National Library of Medicine, “Fact Sheet: Medline”; available at www.nlm.nih.gov/
pubs/factsheets/medline.html.
8. Cynthia D. Mulrow, Deborah J. Cook, and Frank Davidoff, “Systematic Reviews: Criti-
cal Links in the Great Chain of Evidence,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 125, no. 5 (March 1,
1997), pp. 389–391; and Deborah J. Cook et al., “The Relation Between Systematic Reviews
and Practice Guidelines,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 127, no. 3 (August 1, 1997), pp. 210–
216. See also D. Moher et al., “Improving the Quality of Reports of Meta-analyses of Ran-
domized Controlled Trials: The QUORUM Statement,” Lancet, 354, no. 9193 (November 27,
1999), pp. 1896–1900.
9. Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, Eds., Clinical Practice Guidelines: Directions for a
New Program (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990),  p. 38; available at http://
newton.nap.edu/books/0309043468/html.
10. Steven H. Woolf et al., “Potential Benefits, Limitations, and Harms of Clinical Guide-
lines,” British Medical Journal, 318 (February 20, 1999), pp. 527–530.
11. Steven H. Woolf and David Atkins, “The Evolving Role of Prevention in Health Care:
Contributions of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force,” American Journal of Preventive
Medicine 20, suppl. 3 (2001), pp. 13–20.
12. The work of the third task force is supported by AHRQ’s evidence-based practice cen-
ters, and its guidelines are available through the online National Guideline Clearinghouse
(www.guideline.gov). For a comprehensive overview of the USPSTF, see Eileen Salinsky,
“Clinical Preventive Services: When Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?” National Health Policy
Forum, Issue Brief No. 806, August 24, 2005; available at www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB806_
ClinicalPrevServices_08-24-05.pdf.
13. Center for Devices and Radiological Health, “CDRH Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1997,”
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, October 14, 1997; available at www.fda.gov/cdrh/
annrep97.html.
14. In fact, health technology assessment also has roots in the health planning and certificate
of need programs of the early 1970s. Enacted in 1972, Section 1122 of the Social Security Act
required that hospitals receive prior approval for large expenditures for the acquisition of
new equipment and capital improvements in order to receive cost-based reimbursement
from Medicare. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Development of Medical Technology:
Opportunities for Assessment, (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, August 1976); and Egon Jonsson,
“Development of Health Technology Assessment in Europe: A Personal Perspective,” Inter-
national Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 18, no 2 (2002), pp. 171–183.
15. OTA, Development of Medical Technology, p. 4.
16. John M. Eisenberg and Deborah Zarin, “Health Technology Assessment in the United
States,” International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 18, no. 2 (2002), pp. 192–
198.
17. In 1989, the OHTA was folded into the new Agency for Healthcare Research and Qual-
ity. The current Technology Assessment Program is housed in the Center for Outcomes
and Evidence in AHRQ.
18. Eisenberg and Zarin, “Health Technology Assessment.”
19. Neil R. Powe and Robert I. Griffiths, “Clinical-Economic Trials, Background Paper 5,”
Tools for Evaluating Health Technologies: Five Background Papers (Washington, DC: Office of
Technology Assessment, 1994).
Endnotes / continued ➤
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 29
 Endnotes / continued
20. Field and Lohr, Clinical Practice Guidelines, p. 6.
21. Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, Eds. Guidelines for Clinical Practice: From Develop-
ment to Use (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992).
22. Marilyn J. Field, Ed., Setting Priorities for Clinical Practice Guidelines (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 1995), pp. 70–71.
23. Bradford H. Gray, Michael K. Gusmano, and Sara R. Collins, “AHCPR and the Changing
Politics of Health Services Research,” Health Affairs, W3 (June 25, 2003), pp. W3-283–307.
24. Developed by AHRQ in 1997, the National Guideline Clearinghouse now receives close
to a million visitors a month.
25. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), “EPC Topic Nomination and
Selection”; available at www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epc/epctopicn.htm.
26. AHRQ, “EPC Topic Nomination.”
27. AHRQ, “List of Priority Conditions for Research under Medicare Modernization Act
Released,” press release, December 15, 2004; available at www.ahrq.gov/news/press/
pr2004/mmapr.htm.
28. AHRQ, “Overview of the DEcIDE Research Network,” PowerPoint presentation, slide
6, December 2005; available at http://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/decide/index.cfm.
29. Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics (CERTs), “Fact Sheet,” AHRQ Pub.
No. 02-P025, interim revision April 2004; available at www.ahrq.gov/clinic/certsovr.pdf.
30. Accelerating Change and Transformation in Organizations and Networks (ACTION),
“Fact Sheet: Field Partnerships for Applied Research,” AHRQ Pub No. 06-P011, April 2006;
available at www.ahrq.gov/research/action.pdf.
31. CMS, “Fact Sheet: CMS Responds to Stakeholder Feedback Regarding Coverage with
Evidence Development,” July 12, 2005; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/coverage/
download/guidfactsheet.pdf.
32. Susan Bartlett Foote, “Focus on Locus: Evolution of Medicare’s Local Coverage Policy,”
Health Affairs, 22, no. 4 (2003), pp. 137–146; and Susan Bartlett Foote et al., “Resolving the
Tug-of-War Between Medicare’s National and Local Coverage,” Health Affairs, 23, no. 4
(2004), pp. 108–123.
33. CMS, “Medicare Coverage Determination Process: Overview,” last modified Decem-
ber 14, 2005; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/DeterminationProcess/.
34. Sean R. Tunis, “Economic Analysis in Healthcare Decisions,” American Journal of Man-
aged Care, 10, no. 5 (May 2004), pp. 301–304.
35. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), “Medicare Program; Proce-
dures for Making National Coverage Decisions, ”Federal Register, 64, no. 80 (April 27, 1999),
p. 22619.
36. DHHS, “Medicare Program; Establishment of the Medicare Coverage Advisory Com-
mittee and Request for Nominations for Members,” Federal Register, 63, no. 239 (December
14, 1998), p. 68780. Before the MCAC was created, a Health Care Financing Administration
Technical Advisory Committee provided advice on complex coverage decisions.
37. Alan Garber, Stanford University, email communication with author, September 16, 2006.
38. MCAC members are drawn from “clinical and administrative medicine, biologic and
physical sciences, public health administration, advocates for patients, health care data and
information management and analysis, the economics of health care, medical ethics, and
other related professions. ”DHHS, “Charter: Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee,”
November 23, 2004; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/FACA/Downloads/mcaccharter.pdf.
Endnotes / continued ➤
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 30
Endnotes / continued
39. DHHS, “Medicare Program: Criteria and Procedures for Extending Coverage to Certain
Devices and Related Services,” Federal Register, 60, no. 181 (September 19, 1995), p. 48417.
40. Sean R. Tunis, “A Clinical Research Strategy to Support Shared Decision Making,”
Health Affairs, 24, no. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 180–184.
41. CMS, “National Coverage Determinations with Data Collection as a Condition of Cov-
erage: Coverage with Evidence Development,” July 12, 2006; available at www.cms.hhs.gov/
mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=8.
42. BlueCross BlueShield Association, “Technology Evaluation Center,” 2006; available at
www.bcbs.com/tec/index.html.
43. Pharmacoeconomic guidelines were first employed by Australia’s Pharmacy Benefits
program (since 1992) and the Ontario Province’s program (since 1994). Michael Drummond,
“Economic Evaluation in Health Care: Is It Really Useful or Are We Just Kidding Our-
selves?” Australian Economic Review, 27, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 3–11.
44. Jeffrey Crowley and Deb Ashner, “State Medicaid Outpatient Prescription Drug Policies:
Findings from a National Survey, 2005 Update,” Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, October 2005; available at www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/state-medicaid-
outpatient-prescription-drug-policies-findings-from-a-national-survey-2005-update-
report.pdf.
45. Peter J. Neumann, “The Arrival of Economic Evidence in Managed Care Formulary
Decisions: The Unsolicited Request Process,” Medical Care, 43, no. 7 (July 2005) pp. 27–32;
and Ryan Padrez et al., “The Use of Oregon’s Evidence-Based Reviews for Medicaid
Pharmacy Policies: Experiences in Four States,” updated May 2005; available at
www.kff.org/medicaid/4173.cfm.
46. Oregan Health and Science University, “Drug Effectiveness Review Project”; available
at www.ohsu.edu/drugeffectiveness/description.
47. See AARP, “Cost & Availability”; available at www.aarp.org/health/comparedrugs/.
See also Consumer Reports, “Best Buy Drugs”; available at www.crbestbuydrugs.org.
48. See Oregan Health and Science University, “Medicaid Evidence-Based Decisions
Project”; available at www.ohsu.edu/ohsuedu/academic/som/phpm/med/
project_summary.cfm.
49. Keith Syrett, “A Technocratic Fix to the ‘Legitimacy Problem’? The Blair Government
and Health Care Rationing in the United Kingdom,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and
Law, 28, no. 4 (August 2003) pp. 715–746.
50. This section is based largely on National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE), “A Guide to NICE, 2005,” National Health Service, London, 2005, available at
www.nice.org.uk/page.aspx?o=guidetonice; Martin Buxton, “Implications of the Appraisal
Function of the National Institute for the Clinical Excellence (NICE),” Value in Health, 4, no.
3 (2001), pp. 212–216; Syrett, “A Technocratic Fix”; and Steven D. Pearson and Michael D.
Rawlins, “Quality, Innovation, and Value for Money: NICE and the British National Health
Service,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 294, no. 20 (November 2005), pp. 2618–
2622.
51. Originally set up as the “National Institute for Clinical Excellence,” the Institute was
renamed “National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence”; its acronym remained
“NICE.”
52. National Health Service (NHS), NICE Annual Report 2005/06 (London: The Stationery
Office, 2006); available at www.nice.org.uk/343437.
Endnotes / continued ➤
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 31
Endnotes / continued
53. Andrew Stevens and Ruairidh Milne, “Health Technology Assessment in England and
Wales,” International Journal of Technology Assessment in England and Wales, 20, no. 1 (2004),
pp. 11–24; and Department of Public Health and Epidemiology, “The National Horizon
Scanning Centre,” University of Birmingham, available at www.publichealth.bham.ac.uk/
horizon.
54. See Department of Health, National Health Service, “The NHS Health Technology
Assessment Programme”; available at www.ncchta.org/nice/index.htm.
55. The health technology assessment function predated NICE. It originated with the NHS
Research and Development Programme in 1993, when this unit began producing system-
atic literature reviews of the clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of particular inter-
ventions.
56. NHS, NICE Annual Report 2005/06.
57. Buxton, “Implications of the Appraisal Function.”
58. Buxton, “Implications of the Appraisal Function.”
59. Pearson and Rawlins, “Quality, Innovation, and Value for Money”; and Michael Day,
“Three in Five NHS Trusts in England Fail on Basic Care,” British Medical Journal, 333 (July
15, 2006), p. 114.
60. Pearson, and Rawlins, “Quality, Innovation, and Value for Money.”
61. Michael D. Rawlins and Anthony J. Culyer, “National Institute for Clinical Excellence
and Its Value Judgments,” British Medical Journal, 329 (July 24, 2004), pp. 224–227.
62. Simon Stevens, “Reform Strategies for the English NHS,” Health Affairs, 23, no.3 (2004),
pp. 37–44.
63. Suzanne Hill et al., Technology appraisal programme of the national institute of clinical excel-
lence: A review by WHO (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 2003); available at
www.nice.org.uk/page.aspx?o=85797.
64. Syrett, “A Technocratic Fix.”
65. Alan Maynard, Karen Bloor, and Nick Freemantle, “Challenges for the National Insti-
tute for Clinical Excellence,” British Medical Journal, 329 (July 24, 2004), pp. 227–229.
66. Heinz Redwood, The Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Medicines in the British National
Health Service: Lessons for the United States (Suffolk, England: PHARMA, 2006); available at
www.phrma.org/files/Nice%20Report.pdf.
67. Francois Schubert, “Health Technology Assessment,” International Journal of Technology
Assessment in Health Care, 18, no. 2 (2002), pp. 184–191.
68. Richard Cookson, David McDaid, and Alan Maynard, “Wrong SIGN, NICE Mess: Is
National Guidance Distorting Allocation of Resources?” British Medical Journal, 323 (Sep-
tember 29, 2001), pp. 743–745.
69. Maynard, Bloor, and Freemantle, “Challenges.”
70. Maynard, Bloor, and Freemantle, “Challenges.”
71. James E. Sabin and Norman Daniels, “Making Insurance Coverage for New Technolo-
gies Reasonable and Accountable,” JAMA, 279 (1998), pp. 703-704; and Norman Daniels
and James E. Sabin, Setting Limits Fairly: Can We Learn to Share Medical Resources?” (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
72. Gail Wilensky, “Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information,” Health
Affairs, 25, no 6 (2006), pp. w 572–w 585.
73. Annetine C. Gelijns et al., “Evidence, Politics, and Technological Change,” Health Af-
fairs, 24, no. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 29–40.
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 32
The National Health Policy Forum is a nonpartisan research and public
policy organization at The George Washington University. All of its
publications since 1998 are available online at www.nhpf.org.
Endnotes / continued ➤
Endnotes / continued
74. Marc L. Berger and Steven Teutsch, “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: From Science to Ap-
plication,” Medical Care, 43, no. 7, suppl (July 2005), pp. II49–II53; Michael Drummond and
Mark Sculpher, “Common Methodological Flaws in Economic Evaluations,” Medical Care,
43, no. 7, suppl (July 2005), pp. II5–II14; and Mark Helfand, “Incorporating Information
about Cost-Effectiveness Into Evidence-Based Decision-Making: The Evidence-Based Prac-
tice Center (EPC) Model,” Medical Care, 43, no. 7, suppl (July 2005), pp. II33–II43.
75. Marthe R. Gold, “Tea, Biscuits, and Health Care Prioritizing,” Health Affairs, 24, no. 1
(January/February 2005), pp. 234–239.
Background Paper
November 29, 2006
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 33
Clinical Practice Guidelines — Systematically devel-
oped statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific
clinical circumstances.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis — An economic analy-
sis in which all costs are related to one common mea-
sure of effectiveness. Results are usually presented
as a ratio of the increase in costs associated with an
increase in effectiveness.
Coverage Policy — Coverage policy is intended to
promote value in medical care by using payment to
encourage the use of effective care and by withhold-
ing payment for ineffective care. Evidence-based cov-
erage policy promotes the adoption of medical prac-
tices of demonstrated effectiveness through cover-
age decisions and conditions of coverage.*
Economic Evaluation — Considering information
about the economic costs of a health care interven-
tion along with information about its benefits in a
technology assessment or coverage decision. An eco-
nomic evaluation can take the form of a cost-effec-
tiveness analysis, a benefit-cost analysis, or a bud-
getary impact analysis.
Efficacy — The desirable effect of an intervention
under ideal circumstances.
Effectiveness — The desirable effect of an interven-
tion under real-world circumstances
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) — Both a frame-
work for evaluating medical benefit and an approach
to the practice of medicine. As defined by those who
coined the term: “The conscientious, explicit, and ju-
dicious use of current best evidence in making deci-
sions about health care.”†
As one policymaker characterized the aspirations of
EBM, “Evidence-based medicine involves increased
Glossary
reliance on formal, systematic analysis and synthe-
sis of the research literature to determine clinical ef-
fectiveness. It challenges consensus-based judgments
and applies critical assessment of the available re-
search to decide if there is methodologically sound
evidence that the outcomes of a clinical option are
favorable, and it identifies types of patients for whom
the service is most effective.”‡
Health Outcome — The ultimate consequences of a
health care intervention, including, for example sur-
vival, quality of life, ability to function, and freedom
from pain.
Health Technology — The drugs, devices, and
medical and surgical procedures used in medical
care and the organizational and supportive systems
within which such care is provided.
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) — A multi-
disciplinary field that studies the medical, social, ethi-
cal, and economic implications of the development,
use, and diffusion of health technologies. HTAs com-
missioned by the Medicare program to support na-
tional coverage determinations generally focus on
the safety and efficacy of the intervention.
Medical Necessity — Term first used in insurance con-
tracts after World War II, generally understood as medi-
cal care that most physicians considered appropriate.
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ria for Coverage Policy,” Health Affairs, Web Exclusive (May 19, 2004),
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